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abstract
This paper investigates factors that affect the decision to engage in entrepreneurial ac-
tivity using cross-national unbalanced panel data from 2002 to 2010 for forty-eight 
high-income countries, In a random effects model with clustered standard errors, a 
one percentage-point increase in the percentage of the population engaged in ven-
ture capital is associated with a 0.753 percentage-point increase in entrepreneur-
ial activity. A one standard-deviation increase in the social desirability index is asso-
ciated with a 0.149 percentage-point increase in total entrepreneurial activity. Both 
effects are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. While regulatory constraints have a 
statistically insignificant impact on total early-stage entrepreneurial activity, they have 
a negative and statistically significant impact on formal sector entrepreneurial activity.
INTRODUCTION
Private entrepreneurial activity promotes em-ployment opportunities, wealth creation, and human empowerment. While great debate 
surrounds the exact definition of entrepreneurship, 
entrepreneurs characteristically recognize new busi-
ness opportunities and develop profitable processes to 
bring their better ideas to market.  Therefore, entre-
preneurial success can benefit both the entrepreneur 
and the entrepreneur’s country.  Understanding the 
factors that promote private entrepreneurship is im-
portant for both aspiring entrepreneurs and govern-
ments that seek to encourage innovation as a means of 
promoting national prosperity. 
Early research on this subject concentrated on 
personal traits that were correlated with entrepreneur-
ship, such as ambition and a need for achievement.1 
Later research suggested that although individuals 
might possess entrepreneurial traits, they will pur-
sue entrepreneurship only if they consider their eco-
nomic, cultural, political, and social environments to 
be supportive.2  Investigating national factors that in-
fluence entrepreneurial activity, Ardagna and Lusardi 
(2010) found that high levels of regulation discourage 
people from starting a business. However, the effect is 
amplified for people with higher levels of education.3 
Freytag and Thurik (2007) found that differences in 
national levels of entrepreneurship over time can be 
explained by national economic influences. More-
over, persistent cross-country variations are affected 
by cultural and institutional factors.4 In addition to 
investigating broad national influences, studies have 
examined the role of economic clusters in promot-
ing entrepreneurial activity by examining the conver-
gence and agglomeration effects. For instance, Del-
gado, Porter, and Stern (2010) found that the growth 
rate of entrepreneurship increases with the strength 
of cluster environment in the region because clusters 
allow startups to leverage local resources and share 
common technologies, skills, and inputs.5 Therefore, 
the literature has demonstrated that the individual’s 
decision to engage in entrepreneurial activity depends 
upon both personal preferences and the surrounding 
environment. 
After reviewing the current literature on entre-
preneurial activity, this article develops a theoretical 
framework for the determinants of entrepreneurial 
activity on the market level. By connecting the indi-
vidual decision-making process to the surrounding 
macroeconomic environment, a market model out-
lines the factors that impact the supply and demand 
for entrepreneurial labor. The population’s attitudes, 
abilities, and resources affect the supply of entrepre-
neurial labor, while the demand for entrepreneurship 
reflects the opportunities available to entrepreneurs. 
The equilibrium condition reveals the market quantity 
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of entrepreneurs in the market and the price for entre-
preneurial labor. 
The third section provides a cross-national em-
pirical model for the determinants of entrepreneurial 
activity. To capture the theoretical influences, the em-
pirical model uses data from the Global Entrepreneur-
ial Monitor, Doing Business Data Set, and World Data 
Bank. In order to control for country fixed effects, the 
regression uses panel data from 2002 to 2010. The da-
taset contains forty-eight countries classified as either 
high-income or upper-middle income by the World 
Bank. The results identify the relative impact of deter-
minants of entrepreneurial activities on the national 
level of entrepreneurship. After considering the em-
pirical determinants, this article discusses the relevant 
policy implications of these results for promoting en-
trepreneurial activity. 
I. LITERATURE REVIEW
According to Joseph Schumpeter’s definition, 
the entrepreneur initiates the process of “creative de-
struction” or market instability that enables economic 
progress. As part of the evolutionary and organic pro-
cess of capitalism, the entrepreneur constantly revo-
lutionizes the market from within. Not only do en-
trepreneurs create new products or systems; they can 
also create new demands. Instead of focusing on price 
competition in the capitalism system, Schumpeter fo-
cuses on competition posed by new technologies or 
new supplies.6 
While Schumpeter states that entrepreneurs cre-
ate disequilibrium in the economy, the Chicago or 
neoclassical school defines an entrepreneur as an in-
dividual who leads the market to equilibrium. Within 
this school, Frank Knight (1964) focuses on the en-
trepreneur accepting the risk associated with uncer-
tainty. He considers risk to be the “inability to predict 
consumer demand,” which means the success of a 
product or service cannot be ensured.7 Since entre-
preneurs cannot clearly assess the market return for 
their services, they accept greater risk. They depend 
upon a residual wage, the revenue remaining to the 
entrepreneur after all expenses have been paid. By 
taking the risk, the entrepreneur has the potential to 
provide new benefits to consumers that will meet their 
demands and bring the market to equilibrium. 
Although the neoclassical perspective conceptu-
alizes entrepreneurs as leading the market to equilib-
rium, the Austrian school of thought—initiated with 
Carl Menger’s Principles of Economics (1871)—defines 
the entrepreneur as someone who recognizes profit 
opportunities and uses resources to address unmet de-
mand or market inefficiency. These profit opportuni-
ties typically arise after an exogenous shock. Building 
on Menger’s idea, Israel Kirzner defines entrepreneur-
ship as “alertness” to new profit opportunities suc-
ceeded by innovative actions that follow the discovery 
of the opportunity.8 According to Kirzner, an arbitra-
geur is alerted to discrepancies in prices in different 
locations. He or she then develops a process to coordi-
nate the transportation and sale of good to earn a prof-
it.9, i  Identifying a key distinction in the definitions of 
entrepreneurship, Nooteboom (1993) states, “The cre-
ation of potential may be seen as Schumpeterian and 
its realization as Austrian.”10 Instead of focusing on 
the equilibrium state, Kirzner emphasizes entrepre-
neurs’ leading of a market to equilibrium.11 Trying to 
connect the individual entrepreneur to aggregate-level 
results, Wennekers and Thurik (1999) proposed, “En-
trepreneurship is the manifest ability and willingness 
of individuals, on their own, or in teams, within and 
outside existing organizations, to perceive and create 
new economic opportunities… and to introduce their 
ideas in the market, in the face of uncertainty and oth-
er obstacles, by making decisions on location, form 
and the use of resources and institutions.”12 Building 
upon preexisting definitions, Wennekers and Thurik 
offer the most complete description of the entrepre-
neur’s initial ideation and subsequent follow-through.
Empirical Studies of National-Level Entrepreneurship 
Sobel, Clark, and Lee (2007) argued that entre-
preneurs have an inherent incentive to lobby for entry 
regulation after they have achieved success in order 
to delay the entry of new competitors. Using cross-
country Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data 
and The Global Competitiveness Report on a sample of 
twenty-seven Organization for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development (OECD) member countries, 
they investigated the effect of barriers to entry and 
government regulation on entrepreneurial activity. To 
isolate the effect of regulation, the model controlled 
for factors that would affect both the supply of and 
demand for entrepreneurs. The supply of entrepre-
neurs is affected by the unemployment rate because 
individuals who cannot find employment may have 
i  Arbitrage, or the purchase of an asset in one market for immediate resale 
at a higher price in another market, is a riskless and profitable opportunity. 
While an arbitrage takes advantage of simultaneous price discrepancy, an 
entrepreneur accepts significant risk when initiating the process of “creative 
destruction.”
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additional incentive to start a business. Also, domes-
tic credit availability, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
per capita, political stability, and business insolven-
cies influence an individual’s perception of the entre-
preneurial climate. The GDP per capita and median 
age of the population proxies the country’s demand 
for new businesses and products, as countries with a 
higher GDP can support new products and younger 
populations are more receptive to change. After con-
trolling for these relevant explanatory variables, Sobel 
et al. found that a one percentage-point increase in the 
average tariff rate was associated with an 8-percent de-
crease in total entrepreneurial activity (TEA).13 Ad-
ditionally, a one-unit increase in internal barriers to 
entry was associated with an 18-percent decrease in 
TEA.ii While protectionist policies may be intended 
to shield entrepreneurs from global competition, 
they may instead hinder the entrepreneurial process. 
Greater economic freedom was associated with both 
greater entrepreneurial activity and greater business 
failure.iii Controlling for the macroeconomic climate, 
the authors conclude that entry regulation leads to a 
less efficient allocation of resources, as a high rate of 
business failure signals that the market is eliminat-
ing less productive firms and allocating the resources 
more effectively. In order to encourage future na-
tional economic growth, governments must prevent 
successful entrepreneurs from protecting their busi-
nesses through entry regulation. This argument seems 
to imply that future growth depends upon new entry. 
In reality, incumbent firms can initiate the process of 
creative destruction by developing new products that 
render previous products obsolete. 
To assess barriers to entrepreneurial activity, 
Ardagna and Lusardi (2010) examined the effect of 
regulation on both entrepreneurship and entry size. 
The regression used 470,183 observations taken from 
the microeconomic survey conducted by the GEM of 
people aged eighteen to sixty-four in forty-five high-
income, upper-middle-income, and middle-income 
countries.  Primarily interested in people in the plan-
ning process or early stages of business development, 
ii  The internal barriers to entry is an index on a scale of 1 to 7 provided by 
The Global Competitiveness Report: 2002– 2003 and is defined as the “Index of 
the administrative burden for startups [measuring] the ease of starting a new 
business in the country.” 
iii  Economic freedom is measured using a “composite index measure of 
economic freedom that considers government size, legal structure and 
security of property rights, access to sound money, freedom of international 
trade, and regulation of credit, labor and business.” Each country is given a 
score on a scale between 1 and 10, in which a higher score indicates a higher 
level of economic freedom.  
the study used total entrepreneurial activity (TEA) as 
a dummy variable to indicate if the person is involved 
in entrepreneurial activity. To further specify the type 
of entrepreneurial activity, the individuals were sepa-
rated into two categories: opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneurs. In an effort to assess the risk-reward 
profile of the individual, the model included dummy 
variables for self-assessed business skills, fear of fail-
ure, and relevant social networks.iv Additionally, the 
regression contained the demographic variables of 
age, gender, education, and work status to account for 
the individual’s experience, ability, and social back-
ground. Trying to control for the effect of macro con-
ditions on the individual, the model contained the lev-
el of financial development and country fixed effects. 
To better understand the types of people impacted 
by business regulation, the regression included many 
interaction terms between regulation (measured by 
number of entry procedures and number of contract 
procedures) and individual-level explanatory vari-
ables. In this dataset, the highest levels of regulation 
are found in Latin American countries, while the low-
est are in European Union (EU) and OECD member 
countries. The interaction terms examined the extent 
to which the effect of regulation on entrepreneur-
ship may be amplified when interacting with busi-
ness skills, gender, and social networks. When entry 
procedures are at the minimum value, women are less 
likely to start a business because they cannot find em-
ployment. However, when entry procedures are at a 
maximum, women are more likely to start a new busi-
ness. Additionally, high levels of regulation discourage 
individuals with business skills from starting a busi-
ness. People with business skills were 5.8 percentage 
points more likely to start a business in a country with 
low regulation and 3.9 percentage points more likely 
to start a business in a country with high regulation. 
While regulation seemed to have had an overall nega-
tive impact on entrepreneurial activity, the effect was 
stronger on certain types of people.14
Focusing on regulatory constraints and support 
for entrepreneurship, van Stel, Storey, and Thurik 
(2007) also investigated the effect of public policy on 
nascent and actual entrepreneurship. Although public 
policy on entrepreneurship can create both “burdens” 
(i.e., regulation) and “support” (i.e., financial assis-
iv  The “fear of failure” dummy equals one if the individual states that a fear 
of failing prohibits him or her from beginning a business.  A variable with a 
wider range would be a more efficient way of capturing this effect.  The “social 
networks” dummy equals one if the individual knows someone who began a 
business within the past two years. 
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tance and services), the availability of data limited the 
study to entry and labor regulation as measured by 
the World Bank Doing Business dataset. The Eclectic 
Framework for Entrepreneurship developed by Ver-
heul et al. (2001), which controls for key determinants 
of entrepreneurship, provided the basis of the model 
developed by van Stel et. al. Unlike other models of 
entrepreneurial determinants, the Eclectic Frame-
work connects the individual decision-making pro-
cess to the surrounding macroeconomic conditions. 
The number of procedures and days necessary to start 
a business measured the level of business regulation. 
The rates of entrepreneurship were assessed using the 
young business entrepreneurship rate and the nascent 
entrepreneurship rate as measured by the GEM. With 
a two-equation model in which nascent entrepreneur-
ship is the dependent variable in the first equation and 
an independent variable in the second equation for 
young business entrepreneurship, the study investi-
gated the conversion rate from nascent entrepreneur 
to actual young business owner. The model controlled 
for supply-side and demand-side factors that affect the 
risk-reward profile of the entrepreneur. On the supply 
side of entrepreneurship, the model contained con-
trol variables measuring the ease of access to loans, 
venture capital availability, working hours per year, 
secondary school enrollment, and tertiary school en-
rollment.v On the demand side of entrepreneurship, 
the model controlled for economic growth rates, FDI 
and technology transfer, company-university coop-
eration, and industrial structure (share of services).vi 
To account for the demonstration effect, the model 
included the incumbent business ownership rate. 
The combined dataset contains data from forty-seven 
high- and upper-middle income countries from 2000 
to 2005. The results of the two equations support the 
conversion effect—that countries with more nascent 
entrepreneurs also have more entrepreneurs in actual 
business. Therefore, the demonstration or network 
effect dominated the crowding-out effect. Rigidity in 
v  The ease of access to loans is measured on a scale of 1 to 7 based on how 
individuals responded to the question, “How easy is it to obtain a loan in 
your country with only a good business plan and no collateral?” Venture 
capital availability is measured on a scale of 1 to 7 based on how individuals 
responded to the statement, “Entrepreneurs with innovative but risky projects 
can generally find venture capital in your country.” Both surveys were 
conducted by the Global Competitiveness Report. 
vi  The FDI and technology transfer is measured on a scale of 1 to 7 based 
on how people responded to the statement, “Foreign direct investment in 
your country (1=brings little new technology, 7=is an importance source of 
technology).”  The company-university cooperation is assessed based on 
responses to the statement, “Technology transfer between companies and 
universities,” with answers ranging from “insufficient” to “sufficient.” 
hiring and firing had a negative and statistically sig-
nificant impact on both nascent and young entrepre-
neurship activity. While the labor market regulations 
had a strong negative impact on entrepreneurship lev-
els, the impact of entry regulation was limited. Factors 
such as the time, cost, and number of procedures nec-
essary to start a business did not have a significant im-
pact on entrepreneurship. However, minimum capital 
requirements indicated the existence of a barrier to 
entry, as the coefficient was negative and statistically 
significant. Additionally, the magnitude of the barrier 
and the statistical effect was greater for the opportu-
nity nascent rate than the necessity nascent rate. The 
authors speculate that talented entrepreneurs pursu-
ing a business opportunity can overcome regulatory 
burdens other than minimum capital requirements. 
Since opportunity entrepreneurs probably require 
higher levels of capital, they are more affected by this 
barrier. Surprisingly, the study found that the number 
of procedures to start a business and the cost of firing 
had a positive impact on necessity entrepreneurship. 
The authors suggest that the necessity entrepreneurs 
in developing countries with high levels of regulation 
simply avoid the regulations by operating in the in-
formal sector, thus rendering the regulation useless. 
Overall, this study suggests that governments should 
focus on deregulating labor markets to promote entre-
preneurial activity.15                           
Interested in the discrepancies in national en-
trepreneurial activity, Freytag and Thurik (2007) 
explored the effect of cultural factors on entrepre-
neurship. Over time, differences in levels of entrepre-
neurship (measured by the percentage of owners of 
incorporated and unincorporated businesses relative 
to the labor force) can be explained by national eco-
nomic influences. However, persistent cross-country 
variations are affected by cultural and institutional 
components.16 The level of business ownership fol-
lowed a U-shape pattern, declining as less developed 
countries develop and increasing among highly de-
veloped countries.17 To investigate the effect of insti-
tutional factors on entrepreneurship, the regression 
used data from the Eurobarometer survey with 8,000 
respondents from twenty-five European countries 
in addition to U.S. data for the year 2004. Unlike the 
previous models, it distinguishes between latent and 
actual entrepreneurship.vii To control for regulation, 
the regression included the Fraser index for economic 
vii  Latent entrepreneurship measures the proportion of respondents who 
expressed a preference for self-employment over employment. 
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freedom.viii The model controlled for country-specif-
ic effects via country dummy variables in addition to 
a post-communism dummy and two variables mea-
suring public and private spending on health care as 
a share of GDP and life expectancy.ix While the R2 
was only 0.12 for actual entrepreneurship, it was 0.53 
for latent entrepreneurship. The explanatory variables 
were all statistically significant in the latent entrepre-
neurship regression, but were not in the actual entre-
preneurship regression. Therefore, the institutional 
indicator variables provided a better explanation for 
latent entrepreneurship. Freytag and Thurik conclud-
ed that the level of regulation has a negative and sta-
tistically significant effect on latent entrepreneurship 
but not on actual levels of entrepreneurship at the 0.01 
level.18 
In addition to considering regulatory constraints 
on entrepreneurship, Powell and Rodet (2012) investi-
gated the effect of both economic freedom and societal 
approval for entrepreneurship on rates of early-stage 
entrepreneurship. Using data provided by the GEM, 
the World Values Survey, and the Economic Freedom 
of the World Annual Report on twenty-one countries, 
they estimated the effect of cultural explanatory vari-
ables on early-stage entrepreneurial activity. To mea-
sure entrepreneurship, they used early-stage entre-
preneurial activity.x To measure the level of cultural 
legitimation for entrepreneurship, they used the per-
centage of the population that thinks starting a busi-
ness is a desirable career path. Additionally, they cre-
ated a legitimation index variable based on responses 
to the World Values Survey.xi To investigate the effect 
of economic freedom, the model included the five pri-
mary factors in the Economic Freedom Index: “the 
size of government, access to money, the overall rule 
of law, regulation of international trade, and regula-
tion of credit, labor and business.”19 The results were 
statistically significant because a one standard-de-
viation increase in cultural legitimation of entrepre-
viii  The Fraser index incorporates the size of government (expenditures, 
taxes, and enterprises); the legal structure and security of property rights; 
access to sound money; and freedom to trade internationally.
ix  The post-communism dummy was included to control for a cohort of the 
population that may have experienced a command economy, and thus be less 
likely to engage in entrepreneurial activity. 
x  Early-stage entrepreneurial activity is defined as “The percentage of the 
adult population who are actively involved in setting up a business that is less 
than three months old and the percentage of the adult population who owns a 
business that is between 3 and 42 months old” (40). 
xi  The index variable incorporates the responses of individuals to four 
different statements: “Incomes should be more equal,” “The government 
should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for,” 
“Competition is good – it stimulates people to work hard and develop new 
ideas,” and “People can only get rich at the expense of others” (40). 
neurship was associated with a 2.62 percentage-point 
increase in entrepreneurial activity.xii Additionally, a 
one standard-deviation increase in freedom from big 
government was associated with at 3.22 percentage-
point increase in entrepreneurial activity.20  Contrary 
to the results of Freytag and Thurik (2007), the regres-
sion found that freedom from business regulation has 
a statistically significant positive effect on entrepre-
neurial activity. 
In conclusion, strong determinants of entrepre-
neurial activity arise at the individual, national, and 
cluster levels. On the national level, studies have found 
that a wide variety of cultural, economic, political, and 
social influences impact the level of entrepreneurship. 
Great debate surrounds the effect of regulation on en-
trepreneurial activity. For instance, Ardanga and Lu-
sardi (2009) identified a negative effect of entry regu-
lation on entrepreneurship, but van Stel et al. (2007) 
found that labor regulation (but not entry regulation) 
influences entrepreneurial activity. Based on the find-
ings in the prior literature on entrepreneurship, the 
second section of this article constructs a theoretical 
model for the determinants of entrepreneurship. 
II. THEORETICAL MODEL
A Market Model
This section considers the macro conditions that 
influence the individual’s decision to become an en-
trepreneur and develops a theoretical model for the 
level of entrepreneurship in a geographical area.xiii 
The level of entrepreneurship can be explained from a 
labor market perspective. The supply side focuses on 
the attitudes, abilities, and resources that would drive 
profit-maximizing individuals to increase the quan-
tity of entrepreneurial labor supplied for a given wage. 
The demand side considers the factors that influence 
the opportunities available for aspiring entrepreneurs. 
On the demand side, the model identifies factors that 
would drive utility-maximizing individuals to pay a 
higher wage for a given level of entrepreneurial labor. 
The market model also draws on insights from the in-
dividual utility-maximizing model presented in the 
Individual Level Model Appendix.    
xii  The authors mention the possibility of simultaneity bias in this regression. 
Perhaps, as entrepreneurial activity increases, so does the cultural legitimation 
of entrepreneurship. 
xiii  The theoretical model presented in this section is based on a discussion 
of the supply- and demand-side influences of entrepreneurship by Verheul 
(2002). 
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Supply-Side Influences
Education Level (E) – With higher levels of edu-
cation, entrepreneurs are more likely to possess the 
business skills necessary to become successful. Fur-
thermore, higher levels of education encourage inno-
vative thinking and creative problem-solving, which 
help aspiring entrepreneurs develop proprietary ideas 
for new businesses and further increase the gains from 
entrepreneurial activity. Higher education levels will 
increase the proportion of the population with an en-
trepreneurial vision.xiv As aspiring entrepreneurs try 
to raise capital or recruit business partners, education 
enhances their credibility and helps reduce capital 
constraints. Alternatively, since employee income in-
creases with education level, education will also in-
crease the financial returns from employment, which 
increases the opportunity cost and reduces the incen-
tive for entrepreneurship. Overall, however, given the 
intrinsic and extrinsic benefits of education, the net 
effect of education on entrepreneurial aspirations is 
likely positive. With higher levels of education, the 
supply of entrepreneurial activity will likely increase 
for a given entrepreneurial wage.
Access to capital (C) – As access to capital in-
creases, entrepreneurship becomes a more feasible 
and desirable career path. Entrepreneurs can raise 
funds through bank loans, angel investment, venture 
capital, family, friends, and personal finances.  While 
many aspiring entrepreneurs may hope to start their 
own business, capital constraints can inhibit entre-
preneurial activity. Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) 
found that while 63 percent of Americans would pre-
fer to be self-employed, only about 15 percent actually 
are self-employed.  When asked what prevented them 
from becoming self-employed, 51.3 percent cited lack 
of capital or money. 21 Access to capital will enable 
people with entrepreneurial visions to pursue their 
ideas and increase the quantity of labor supplied for a 
given entrepreneurial wage.
Unemployment Rate (U) – As the unemploy-
ment rate increases, many individuals will lose their 
jobs and hence the opportunity cost of becoming an 
entrepreneur will decline for them. Loss of employ-
ment could thus encourage greater levels of entrepre-
neurial activity. However, since a high unemployment 
rate reflects poor economic conditions and the per-
ceived probability of business failure, it could also dis-
xiv  Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) include the proportion of the 
population with entrepreneurial vision as a key determinant of the number of 
entrepreneurs in the economy. 
courage individuals from engaging in entrepreneurial 
activity. Therefore, the net effect is indeterminate.  
Culture of Entrepreneurship (Z) – Individual-
istic cultures that value hard work over leisure time 
and support the idea of a “self-made man” can encour-
age entrepreneurship by increasing the psychological 
gains from entrepreneurial activity. Societies that view 
entrepreneurs as job creators and innovators will hold 
entrepreneurs in high esteem. Societal approval for 
entrepreneurship could increase the level of entrepre-
neurial activity at a given entrepreneurial wage.
Composition of the Society (S) – Groups who 
feel marginalized from society may have greater in-
centives to start their own businesses because they 
will have difficulty finding employment opportunities 
or encounter glass ceilings that prevent promotion. 
These barriers to success as employees will lower both 
the financial and psychological gains of employment 
and encourage higher levels of entrepreneurial activity 
at a given wage.   
Tax policy and regulation (T) – Corporate taxes 
and regulation can discourage people from becoming 
entrepreneurs by creating barriers to entry and raising 
the costs of starting a business. These regulations will 
decrease the financial gains from entrepreneurial ac-
tivity and discourage entrepreneurship. If the govern-
ment launches a campaign to promote entrepreneur-
ship and lowers both taxes and regulation, it could 
increase the returns from entrepreneurial activity and 
increase the level of entrepreneurial activity at a given 
wage.
Entrepreneurial cluster (EC) – Entrepreneur-
ial clusters can encourage additional entrepreneurial 
activity by establishing business networks, access to 
capital, and a strong consumer base. Successful entre-
preneurs can inspire those around them to consider 
entrepreneurship as a feasible career path. New firms 
could reduce the perceived risk for aspiring entrepre-
neurs. By working in this environment, entrepreneurs 
experience greater utility due to the business networks 
that reduce perceived risks. If agglomeration effects 
increase the pool of available inputs and labor and the 
cluster develops a regional comparative advantage, the 
financial gains from entrepreneurship will increase. 
After working for a business and gaining entrepre-
neurial experience, aspiring entrepreneurs may leave 
established firms to create “spinoff ” firms. Their prior 
experience reduces their probability of failure and 
perceived risk of entrepreneurial activity. On the other 
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hand, the market for entrepreneurial activity can be-
come saturated and competitive, which increases the 
probability of failure.  Overall, the benefits from oper-
ating in a business cluster likely outweigh the costs of 
greater competition.
     
Demand-Side Influences
GDP per capita (Y) – At a given price of entrepre-
neurial labor, the demand for entrepreneurial activity 
will rise with an increase in GDP per capita. At higher 
income levels, consumers demand a greater quantity 
of differentiated products. As income elasticity for 
new products increases, the increase in gains from 
entrepreneurial activity will exceed that of traditional 
employment. With a greater income, consumers are 
willing to pay more for the entrepreneur’s labor. 
Economic Growth (EG) – As income expands 
with economic growth, households will likely increase 
consumption and consequently increase demand for 
entrepreneurial labor. For a given price of entrepre-
neurial labor, the demand for entrepreneurial labor 
will increase as utility-maximizing individuals in-
crease and diversify their consumption. These new 
business opportunities increase the gains from en-
trepreneurial activity and new industries will likely 
arise to meet new demands. However, the effect of 
economic growth on entrepreneurial activity is the-
oretically ambiguous because an increase in wages 
from employment increases the opportunity cost of 
self-employment, which could decrease the supply of 
entrepreneurial labor at a given entrepreneurial wage.
Technological Development (TD) – New tech-
nologies create new entrepreneurial opportunities. 
For instance, the information technology sector cre-
ated demand for new products and new economic op-
portunities for web developers and programmers. At 
a given price of entrepreneurial labor, the demand for 
these services increases with the development of the 
information technology sector. By disrupting markets 
through the process of “creative destruction,” techno-
logical development creates new demand for entre-
preneurial activity at a given price of entrepreneurial 
labor.  
Based on these theoretical influences, Figure 1 
illustrates the supply and demand in the market for 
entrepreneurs. 
Figure 1: Market for Entrepreneurs
      
P* is the equilibrium price and Q* the equilib-
rium quantity of entrepreneurs in the market.
The general reduced-form equation is the follow-
ing: 
Q = f(E±, C+, U±, Z+, S+, T-, EC±, Y+, EG±, TD+) 
In sum, this market model for entrepreneurs 
builds upon the insights of an individual-level model 
to better explain the macro conditions that would in-
fluence the gains from entrepreneurial activity relative 
to employment and the probability of business failure. 
In the next section an empirical model for the deter-
minants of entrepreneurial activity is discussed.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
To test the theoretical determinants of market-
level entrepreneurship, the model shown in the equa-
tion below includes relevant explanatory variables that 
influence the national level of entrepreneurial activity. 
To estimate the empirical effect of the theoretical de-
terminants of entrepreneurship, the model controls 
for all theoretical determinants. This general empiri-
cal model is used for both an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and panel data model, and the validity of these 
models is discussed below. 
TEAit = β0 + β1Rit + β2Tit + β3Eit + β4Sit + β5Nit + β6Fit + 
β7Cit + β8VCit + β9Uit + β10Iit + β11Pit + β12Yit + β13SCit + αi + 
vt + uit
β1 < 0, β2 < 0, β4 > 0, β5 > 0, β6 < 0, β7 > 0, β8 > 0, β10 > 0,
 β11 > 0, β12 > 0, β13 < 0
TEAit = Total early-stage entrepreneurial activity 
in country i in year t
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the procedures, time, and cost associated with     
    starting a business in country i in year t
Tit = Total tax rate for country i in year t
Eit = Average schooling (in years) for the popula-
tion aged fifteen and above in country i in year t
Sit  = Percentage of the population that thinks an 
entrepreneur has a high social status in country 
     i in year t
Nit = Percentage of the population that knows 
someone who started a business in country i in 
      year t
Fit = Percentage of the population that states that 
fear of failure would prevent them from 
      starting a new business in country i in year t
Cit = Percentage of the population that lives in 
urban agglomerations of more than one million in 
      country i in year t
VCit  = Percentage of the population that person-
ally provided funds for a new business started by 
another individual (excluding any purchases of 
stocks or mutual funds) within the past three years in 
country i in year t
Uit = Unemployment rate (unemployed as a per-
centage of total labor force) in country i in year t
Iit = Immigrants (percentage of total population 
that are immigrants) in country i in year t
Pit = Patent applications by residents and non-
residents per hundred thousand persons in 
country i in year t
Yit = GDP per capita (PPP$) in country i in year t
SCit = Severance pay measured in weeks of sal-
ary per separated worker in country i in year t
αi = Country fixed effects in country i 
vt = Time effects in country i
uit = Random error 
The level of entrepreneurial activity is first mea-
sured by total entrepreneurial activity (TEA), which 
is defined as the sum of the percentage of the popula-
tion between eighteen and sixty-four years of age that 
establishes a business that they will own or co-own 
that has not paid wages for three months and the per-
centage of the population that owns and manages a 
business that is less than forty-two months old but has 
paid wages. TEA provides a good measure of the seg-
ment of the population that has decided to engage in 
entrepreneurial activity but fails to capture their suc-
cess, growth, or profitability. However, the percentage 
of the population engaged in entrepreneurship is most 
relevant for this article because it models the determi-
nants of the level of entrepreneurship in a country.  
To capture the magnitude of the regulatory con-
straints, the model includes measures by Doing Busi-
ness of the procedures, time, and cost associated with 
starting a business. In order to compare the level of 
regulation across 189 countries, the dataset uses a 
standardized business “that is 100 percent domestical-
ly owned, has start-up capital equivalent to ten times 
income per capita, engages in general industrial or 
commercial activities and employs between 10 and 50 
people within the first month of operations.”22 There-
fore, the regulation variables apply to well-funded, 
high-growth startups and fail to include industry or 
trade-specific regulation. Doing Business considers 
regulation in the three stages of starting a business: 
preregistration, registration, and post-registration. In 
order to legally operate, businesses typically have to 
check the availability of a name, register with the tax 
authorities, attain a business license, legalize company 
books, and acquire a company seal. In addition to reg-
ulation, tax policies could also affect the decision to 
engage in entrepreneurial activity by reducing finan-
cial incentives. Alternatively, tax credits or capital for 
startups could encourage entrepreneurial activity. Do-
ing Business provides a variable for the total tax rate 
as a percentage of the firm’s profit based on the level 
of taxation in five different areas: profit or corporate 
income tax, labor taxes, property taxes, turnover tax-
es, and other taxes such as municipal fees and vehicle 
taxes. While entrepreneurs will face different tax rates 
based on industry and firm size, the Doing Business 
dataset provides an estimate of the country’s corporate 
tax rates.23
The model controls for observable characteris-
tics of the population that theoretically influence the 
decision to engage in entrepreneurial activity. The lev-
el of education is measured by the World Bank’s World 
Development Report (2013) as the average years of 
schooling for the population aged fifteen or above.24 
The decision to apply one’s education to entrepreneur-
ial activity depends upon the national culture of entre-
preneurship. To control for the society’s perception of 
entrepreneurship, the model contains a variable of the 
percentage of the population that believes successful 
entrepreneurs have high social status and respect, as 
measured by the GEM. To capture network effects, the 
model includes the percentage of the population that 
knows someone who started a business. Assessing the 
52
columbia university journal of politics & society
magnitude of a country’s entrepreneurial spirit, the re-
gression includes the GEM’s measure of the percent-
age of the population that believes fear of failure would 
prevent them from starting a new business. While the 
social status variable captures the general attitude to-
wards other entrepreneurs, the fear-of-failure variable 
measures personal risk aversion. Societies that gener-
ally value financial security and stability over risk and 
adventure will likely have a higher fear of failure.25   
Depending on the national culture of entrepre-
neurship, entrepreneurial clusters may arise in urban 
agglomerations that create entrepreneurial networks 
to further encourage innovation.  To control for the 
presence of entrepreneurial clusters, the model con-
tains the World Bank’s measure of the percentage 
of the population living in urban agglomerations 
of more than one million people.26  This may be a 
weak measure of an entrepreneurial cluster because 
urban agglomerations have varying levels of entre-
preneurial networks and infrastructure. While entre-
preneurial cultures and clusters will help foster new 
business ideas, these ideas cannot be implemented 
without access to capital.  The ease of accessing capital 
for entrepreneurial activity will vary across countries 
based on the size of the venture capital industry and 
the access to credit. The model therefore includes the 
GEM measure of the percentage of the adult popula-
tion in a country that personally provided funds for a 
new business started by another individual, excluding 
any purchases of stocks or mutual funds, in a given 
year. This variable provides a general measure of the 
venture capital industry; however, it is an imperfect 
measure because a large venture capital industry may 
be controlled by relatively few people. The amount of 
venture capital raised as a percentage of national in-
come would provide a more accurate measure of the 
funds available to entrepreneurs, but the unavailabil-
ity of such data precludes this option.27 
 Furthermore, the model contains national-
level variables that capture the opportunity cost of 
engaging in entrepreneurial activity. The effect of un-
employment is captured by the World Bank’s measure 
of unemployment as a percentage of the total labor 
force.xv Additionally, the percentage of immigrants 
among the total population controls for groups that 
xv  According to the Work Bank’s World Development Indicators, the labor 
force is defined as “people ages 15 and older who meet the International 
Labour Organization definition of the economically active population: all 
people who supply labor for the production of goods and services during a 
specified period. It includes both the employed and the unemployed.” See 
World Bank.  World Development Indicators 2013. n.p.: Washington, D.C.:, 
2012, p. 61.
may feel marginalized or discriminated against in 
traditional jobs and thus more inclined to engage in 
entrepreneurial activity. Since technological develop-
ment has the potential to disrupt markets and create 
new entrepreneurial opportunities, the regression in-
cludes a variable calculated using World Bank data for 
a country’s patent applications by residents and non-
residents per hundred thousand people.28 Although 
not all patents are associated with technological devel-
opment, the variable serves as a measure for the rate 
of innovation in a country. In an effort to measure the 
flexibility of the labor market, the regression includes 
the cost of firing an employee. 
The error term of the regression model (uit) 
captures all effects not specified by the model due to 
incorrect functional form, omitted variable bias, hu-
man variability, measurement errors in the dependent 
variable, idiosyncratic events, and simultaneity bias. 
As part of the ordinary least squares (OLS) assump-
tions, the expected value of the error term conditional 
upon all explanatory variables is zero.29 According to 
Alan Krueger (2001), “If the relationship between the 
dependent variable… and the explanatory variables… 
is linear, if the explanatory variables and the equation 
error are independent, then ordinary least squares us-
ing data from a random sample provides an unbiased 
estimate of the ‘true’ regression line. An unbiased esti-
mator will not always yield the correct estimate, but it 
will be correct on average.”30 By including all relevant 
explanatory variables, the regression models strive to 
maintain the assumptions of the error term to ensure 
that the regression results are unbiased and that the 
estimates are correct on average.
 
The Sample 
The regression employs data from the 2013 edi-
tions of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, the Do-
ing Business Database, World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators and the World Development Report 
on high-income and upper-middle-income countries 
from 2002 to 2010. The Global Entrepreneurial Moni-
tor (GEM) is the largest ongoing study of entrepre-
neurial dynamics and the 2010 dataset is its most 
recent dataset available to the public. In addition to 
surveying the adult population on entrepreneurial ac-
tivity and attitudes, the GEM surveys national experts 
on government policies, commercial infrastructure, 
and development. The Doing Business Database cre-
ated by the International Finance Corporation and 
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the World Bank offers data on indicators of the ease of 
doing business in a country. The World Development 
Indicators and World Development Report provide rel-
evant explanatory variables on national education, in-
come, and development.  
The empirical analysis begins with an OLS re-
gression of the 2009 data to estimate the key determi-
nants of entrepreneurial activity in a given year. Due 
to the availability of data for the relevant explanatory 
variables in the model, only thirty countries are in-
cluded in the dataset used for the 2009 OLS regres-
sion. A full list of countries is given in the Data Ap-
pendix. When combining data from the GEM and the 
Doing Business Database, 2009 offers a larger sample 
of countries than 2010; the countries that the GEM 
and Doing Business Database survey vary each year. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on total entre-
preneurial activity in 2009 as reported by the GEM. 
On average, 9.22 percent of the population is working 
on a business less than forty-two months old. Since the 
mean is greater than the median, the data are skewed 
right. The minimum total entrepreneurial activity in 
2009 (3.26 percent) is found in Japan. An article in 
The Economist by Tom Standage (2007) stated that Ja-
pan has the second-lowest level of venture-capital in-
vestment as a portion of GDP of all OECD countries. 
Japan’s rigid labor market increases the difficulty of 
finding another job after a startup fails. Additionally, 
Japan has a culture that values conformity over indi-
vidualism.31  
South American countries tend to have the high-
est level of total entrepreneurial activity (TEA) in the 
dataset. The higher levels of entrepreneurial activity in 
Colombia are likely due to its poor labor market and 
lack of alternative economic opportunities. Colombia 
has the maximum level with 22.57 percent of the pop-
ulation engaged in entrepreneurship. Peru has a TEA 
of 20.93 percent, and Venezuela has a TEA of 18.66 
percent. Since these countries also have low GDP per 
capita compared to the other countries in the dataset, 
they likely have greater room for economic growth 
and new entrepreneurial activity. The correlation co-
efficient between TEA and GDP per capita is -0.6156. 
Additionally, on average, in the sample of countries, 
66.03 percent of the adult population aged eighteen to 
sixty-four states that entrepreneurship is a desirable 
career path, as compared to 90.45 percent in Colom-
bia. In contrast, Japan has the minimum percentage 
of the population that considers entrepreneurship a 
desirable career path, with only 28.11 percent of the 
population in Japan considering entrepreneurship 
a desirable career path. Countries in the European 
Union fall below the average for both TEA and desir-
able career path. For instance, Belgium has a TEA of 
3.51 percent and desirable career path of 45.63 per-
cent. The correlation coefficient between desirable ca-
reer path and TEA is 0.6545. Table 2 shows descriptive 
statistics for the explanatory variables.  
Cross-Section Regression Results
The regression results for the year 2009 shown in 
Table 3 provide greater insight into the determinants 
of entrepreneurial activity. While the full panel data-
set contains forty-eight or fifty countries, the regres-
sion for 2009 has thirty or thirty-one countries.xvi 
Column 1 of Table 3 presents the estimated linear 
OLS regression of total entrepreneurial activity for all 
of the explanatory variables for the year 2009. Con-
sistent with theory and prior research, the results in-
dicate that access to capital has the most statistically 
significant effect on entrepreneurial activity, as mea-
sured by the level of significance. (Surveys conducted 
by GEM on the greatest barriers to entrepreneurial ac-
tivity identify access to capital as the most commonly 
cited barrier.)32 A one percentage-point increase in 
the percentage of the population engaged in venture 
capital is associated with a 0.979-percent-increase in 
total entrepreneurial activity, and this effect is statis-
tically significant at the 0.01 level. Since the average 
percentage of the population engaged in venture capi-
tal is 3.26 percent, a one percentage-point increase 
would represent an increase of approximately a third 
of the current venture capital population. However, 
the effect of the venture capital industry could be in-
xvi  Doing Business does not include a measure of separation costs for 
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flated by simultaneity bias; as entrepreneurial activity 
increases, the population will have a greater number 
of opportunities to engage in venture capital.  
In fact, Kreft and Sobel (2005) conducted Grang-
er causality tests and found that successful entrepre-
neurial activity attracts venture capital.33, xvii High 
levels of entrepreneurial activity may help reduce the 
perceived risk surrounding entrepreneurial activity 
and the allocation of funds to venture capital. Addi-
tionally, the percentage of the population that states 
that fear of business failure prevents them from start-
ing a business also has a marginally statistically sig-
nificant influence on entrepreneurial activity. A one 
percentage-point increase in the percentage of the 
population that fears failure is associated with a 0.141 
percentage-point decrease in total entrepreneurial 
activity, but this effect is only statistically significant 
at the 0.10 level. The other explanatory variables are 
statistically insignificant. According to the adjusted 
R2, the linear regression explains 62.5 percent of the 
xvii  The concept of Granger causality according to Grosche (2014) is 
stated as follows: “a variable X can be said to cause another variable Y if 
the probability of correctly forecasting Yt+1, with t = 1, …T, increases by 
including information about Xt in addition to other information contained 
in a specific information set at time t.” See Stephanie-Carolin Grosche, “What 
Does Granger Causality Prove? A Critical Examination of the Interpretation 
of Granger Causality Results on Price Effects of Index Trading in Agricultural 
Commodity Markets.”  Journal of Agricultural Economics 65, no. 2 (2014): 279.
variation in total entrepreneurial activity.  
Given the high adjusted R2 and low levels of sta-
tistical significance, the regression results likely suffer 
from multicollinearity. With the presence of multicol-
linearity, the point estimates remain correct, but the 
standard errors are biased upwards. A variance infla-
tion factor (VIF) that exceeds 4 is considered signifi-
cant, and the variable for number of procedures has a 
VIF of 4.68. The high degree of correlation between 
procedures and time (with a correlation coefficient of 
0.7304 that is statistically significant at the 0.01 level) 
likely causes the large VIF for procedures. While the 
different measures of regulation capture theoretically 
different factors, in reality these variables all measure 
the regulatory constraints that the potential entrepre-
neur perceives. The following regression results adjust 
the model in order to address the likelihood of multi-
collinearity.
Column 2 of Table 3 reports the results for a re-
gression that includes the non-linearity on GDP per 
capita (measured in hundreds of dollars adjusted for 
purchasing power parity) and excludes separation 
costs. While separation costs serve as a general mea-
sure for the level of labor regulation, they fail to cap-
ture the effect of labor regulation that is relevant for 
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The second regression therefore excludes separation 
costs since they do not capture the rigidity of the la-
bor market, which theoretically determines entrepre-
neurial activities. When the regression contains a qua-
dratic term for GDP per capita, the effect of GDP per 
capita and its quadratic are statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level, and the explanatory power of the model 
increases as the adjusted R2 rises from 0.625 to 0.763. 
Since the coefficient on GDP per capita is negative, the 
coefficient on (GDP per capita)2 is positive, and the 
regression constant is positive, the graph of total en-
trepreneurial activity (TEA) against GDP per capita is 
U-shaped. Freytag and Thurik (2007) also identified a 
U-shaped relationship between GDP per capita 
and entrepreneurship both across countries and 
within countries over time. As countries devel-
op, the level of entrepreneurial activity initially 
declines. Freytag and Thurik hypothesized that 
as a country transitions from a labor-intensive 
to capital-intensive economy or from an agri-
culturally-based economy to a manufacturing-
based economy, the number of entrepreneurial 
opportunities declines. The increasing amount 
of capital required for an aspiring entrepreneur 
to enter a market could become a more substan-
tial barrier to entrepreneurial activity. However, 
as countries continue to develop and transition 
from manufacturing-based economies to service 
economies, the level of entrepreneurial activity 
increases due to a decline in minimum capital 
requirements. At the minimum point on the 
estimated parabola, GDP per capita is $25,736. 
In the sample, the mean level of GDP per cap-
ita (adjusted for purchasing power parity) is 
$23,035. Therefore, countries with a per-capita 
GDP approximately 12 percent above the mean 
demonstrate a positive association between per-
capita GDP and TEA.    
With the non-linearity on per-capita GDP 
included, the coefficient on venture capital re-
mains statistically significant at the 0.01 level, 
and the magnitude of the coefficient declines 
slightly to 0.92. In this model, the effect of im-
migration becomes statistically significant at the 
0.05 level. A one percentage-point increase in 
the percentage of the population that immigrat-
ed to the country is associated with only a 0.128 
percentage-point decrease in entrepreneurial ac-
tivity. While this effect is contrary to this article’s 
theory, immigrants may be less familiar with 
the laws and business environment in a foreign 
country and thus less likely to start a business.xviii All 
other variables are statistically insignificant. Despite 
the strong correlation of 0.65 between TEA and de-
sirable career choice that is statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level, the effect of the regression coefficient 
is statistically insignificant. Daniel Eisenberg’s (2013) 
work on the personal characteristics of entrepreneurs, 
Worthless, Impossible and Stupid, provides insights 
into why the variables that capture social desirability 
xviii  Jordan has excessive influence on the effect of immigration, and when 
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such as the percentage of the population that believes 
entrepreneurship is a desirable career path and the 
percentage of the population that fears business fail-
ure are insignificant. Eisenberg states “the only way 
to create and capture such extraordinary value is to 
perceive its potential where many others do not.”34 
Since entrepreneurs must adopt a contrarian mind-
set to work on an idea that others fail to recognize as 
valuable initially, societal approval does not influence 
aspiring entrepreneurs. 
The effect of different types of regulatory con-
straints is also statistically insignificant. Similarly, van 
Stel, Storey and Thurik (2007) found that factors such 
as the time, cost, and number of procedures necessary 
to start a business do not have a significant impact 
on entrepreneurship.35 Powell and Rodet (2012) af-
firmed this conclusion, and both sets of authors offer 
the same explanation for this somewhat surprising 
result.36 Since the GEM dataset measures both the 
formal and informal sectors, the effect is likely insig-
nificant because regulation influences the distribution 
between the formal and informal sector more than to-
tal level of entrepreneurial activity.  
Although the four variables that measure regula-
tory constraints (time, procedures, cost, and corporate 
tax rate) capture different theoretical influences, they 
exhibit high degrees of correlation. The correlation co-
efficient between the time and number of procedures 
required to start a business is 0.7304, and the corre-
lation coefficient between the cost and procedures is 
0.5604. In order to reduce the presence of multicol-
linearity that biases standard errors upward, Column 
3 reports results from a regression that excludes the 
time necessary to start a business and the number 
of procedures required to start a business.xix In this 
model, the cost of starting a business becomes statis-
tically significant at the 0.05 level and the tax rate is 
statistically significant at the 0.10 level. A one percent-
age-point increase in the cost of starting a business is 
associated with a 0.138 percentage-point increase in 
total entrepreneurial activity. A one percentage-point 
increase in the tax rate is associated with a 0.093 per-
centage-point increase in total entrepreneurial activ-
ity. While this article’s theory suggests that the regu-
latory constraints would have negative coefficients, 
they have positive coefficients in this model. Govern-
ments may impose higher regulations and seek to earn 
xix   Influence statistics for the regression results in Column 3 reveal that 
none of the countries have excessive influence on the explanatory variables; 
all influence statistics are less than the absolute value of one.  
greater tax revenue from businesses in countries that 
have a strong business and entrepreneurial culture. 
Since governments may respond to the level of entre-
preneurial activity when creating the regulation, this 
estimate may be incorrect due to simultaneity bias.xx 
Furthermore, South American countries have the 
highest levels of entrepreneurial activity and the high-
est levels of business regulation. The GEM’s measure 
of entrepreneurial activity includes the informal sec-
tor, so regulation may affect the distribution between 
the formal and informal sector. 
In the model represented by Column 3, the ef-
fect of urban agglomerations and unemployment be-
come statistically significant at the 0.01 level. A one 
percentage-point increase in unemployment is asso-
ciated with a decline in total entrepreneurial activ-
ity of 0.225. Because an increase in unemployment 
is associated with poor economic conditions and the 
perceived probability of business failure, these results 
suggest that people are less likely to leave their job 
in existing corporations to become entrepreneurs in 
times of economic uncertainty. Since the percentage 
of the population that considers entrepreneurship a 
desirable career path, the percentage of the popula-
tion that knows someone who started a business, and 
the percentage of the population that does not fear 
failure all measure social desirability of entrepreneur-
ship, Column 3 includes an index variable for these 
three variables. Like the individual components of the 
index variable in the previous model, the Social De-
sirability Index is statistically insignificant. These re-
gression results differ in statistical significance from 
that of Powell and Rodet (2012), who created an index 
variable for cultural legitimation using both responses 
from the World Values Survey and the percentage of 
the population that perceives entrepreneurship to be 
a desirable career path. Their model produced results 
that were statistically significant because a one stan-
dard-deviation increase in cultural legitimation of en-
trepreneurship was associated with a 2.62 percentage-
point increase in entrepreneurial activity. In addition 
to having a different index variable, Powell and Rodet 
(2012) implemented a different specification strategy. 
The authors mentioned the possibility of simultane-
ity bias in this regression; perhaps, as entrepreneurial 
xx  An index variable of all the four measures of regulatory constraints created 
using a geometric mean is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  A one-unit 
increase in the index is associated with an increase in total entrepreneurial 
activity of 0.247. This index variable was excluded from the regression results 
because the key regulatory constraints are the cost of starting a business and 
the corporate tax rates.  By including procedures and the time required to start 
a business, the effect of cost and taxes cannot be isolated.  
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activity increases, so does the cultural legitimation. To 
try to reduce the effect of this variable, they used GEM 
data from 2008 and World Values data from 2005. In 
the model presented in this paper, the variable for the 
size of the venture capital industry may capture some 
of the influence of the Social Desirability Index. Soci-
eties that value entrepreneurial activity and risk-tak-
ing may encourage people to allocate more funds to 
venture capital. In fact, the correlation between these 
two variables is 0.57 and statistically significant at the 
0.01 level. Additionally, the access-to-capital variable 
may capture some of the effect of the unemployment 
variable. During times of poor economic conditions, 
individuals will have less money to invest and may 
prefer to invest in more stable, existing organizations. 
In Column 3, all other explanatory variables are statis-
tically insignificant.
The results from Column 3 provide important 
insights into the factors driving the decision to be-
come an entrepreneur. At different stages of economic 
development as measured by GDP per capita, people 
have different perceptions about entrepreneurial op-
portunities and the barriers they must overcome. As 
GDP per capita increases, the level of entrepreneurial 
activity initially decreases but then increases as coun-
tries transition to a service-based economy. Capi-
tal constraints, as measured by the percentage of the 
population engaged in venture capital, have a statisti-
cally significant impact on entrepreneurship when es-
timated by TEA. The size of the venture capital indus-
try probably affects the entrepreneur’s perception of 
capital constraints and the likelihood of successfully 
raising capital. If entrepreneurs believe that they will 
be able to obtain venture capital, they are more likely 
to engage in entrepreneurial activity. Based on the re-
sults reported in Column 3, the economic climate—as 
captured by the level of unemployment and the per-
centage of the population living in urban agglomera-
tions—has a statistically significant impact on the level 
of entrepreneurial activity. As the level of unemploy-
ment increases, people likely become more concerned 
about giving up their job in an existing organization 
and become less likely to engage in entrepreneurial 
activity. As the percentage of the population living in 
urban agglomerations increases, the level of entrepre-
neurial activity increases. Business networks in urban 
areas likely facilitate entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Unemployment and urban agglomeration become 
statistically insignificant when the regression includes 
dummy variables for Latin America and the Europe-
an Union, as the effects of the economic climate are 
likely included in the regional effects of the dummy 
variable. Since the cross-section of countries using 
ordinary least squares regression fails to capture im-
portant country fixed effects and time effects, the next 
section expands the model to a panel dataset to reduce 
the likelihood of omitted variable bias.
Panel Data
Unlike a single-period ordinary least squares es-
timation, regressions with panel data can control for 
unobservable time-constant explanatory variables 
that theoretically determine total entrepreneurial ac-
tivity and are correlated with the included explanatory 
variables, which helps minimize the presence of omit-
ted variable bias. In our panel data model, country 
fixed effects 
(αi) control for unobservable time-constant char-
acteristics of the countries. Country fixed effects such 
as cultural factors, labor-leisure preferences, quality of 
education, corporate cultures, and labor market flex-
ibility vary greatly across countries and theoretically 
determine the level of entrepreneurial activity within 
a country, but are unlikely to vary over the nine-year 
time frame of 2002 to 2010. While starting a business 
provides the entrepreneur with greater independence, 
entrepreneurs sacrifice the security that comes with 
working for an established organization. Societies that 
encourage security over risk-taking will likely have 
lower levels of entrepreneurial activity. Meanwhile, 
since starting and managing a new business likely 
requires additional time commitments, cultures that 
highly value leisure time and family life may have 
fewer entrepreneurs as a percentage of the popula-
tion. Highly rigid labor markets that have low job 
turnover rates could discourage people from engaging 
in entrepreneurship because they will face additional 
challenges of finding new jobs should their businesses 
fail. While these influences cannot be captured with 
explanatory variables, they theoretically determine 
the level of total entrepreneurial activity. Within the 
time frame of the panel dataset, the World Develop-
ment Report records observations on the average level 
of education and the immigration for only one year. 
In order to estimate a regression with panel data, the 
dataset must include observations from at least two 
different time periods. To the extent that immigration 
and education are constant over the time period, they 
are included in country fixed effects.   
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In addition to country fixed effects, omitted 
variable bias might occur due to variation over time 
that is consistent across countries. While patents per 
hundred thousand persons serves as an estimate of 
the level of technological development in a specific 
country, time effects (vt) control for changes in tech-
nology over time across all upper-middle-income and 
high-income countries. For example, the proliferation 
of web technologies, software frameworks, and online 
hosting from 2002 to 2010 reduced the startup costs for 
new technology companies. The release of the iPhone 
in 2007 created new opportunities for entrepreneurs 
to build businesses around smartphone applications. 
The global perception of the financial security associ-
ated with starting a business, especially in the infor-
mation technology sector, fell dramatically following 
the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2001. These fac-
tors could influence the level of entrepreneurial activ-
ity in upper-middle-income and high-income coun-
tries, and the model controls for these time effects to 
the extent that they are present and uniform across 
countries. 
In the panel data model, the sample is expand-
ed to include forty-eight or fifty high-income and 
upper-middle-income countries, depending on the 
variables included in the model. Since the panel data 
model controls for country fixed effects, the number 
of explanatory variables needed declined, and this 
decline increased the availability of data. 
In the panel data regression model presented 
in Column 1, GDP per capita is statistically signifi-
cant at the 0.01 level and its quadratic is statistical-
ly significant at the 0.05 level.xxi With a p-value of 
0.0137, per-capita GDP and its quadratic are jointly 
significant at the 0.05 level. As in the 2009 OLS re-
gression, the graph of total entrepreneurial activity 
against per-capita GDP is U-shaped, and these re-
sults are consistent with that of Freytag and Thurik 
(2007). Access to capital is statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level. In this model, a one percentage-point 
increase in the percentage of the population engaged 
in venture capital is associated with a 0.753 percent-
age-point increase in total entrepreneurial activity. 
Also, the Social Desirability Index variable is statis-
tically significant at the 0.01 level. A one standard-
deviation increase in the Social Desirability Index is 
associated with a 0.149 percentage-point increase in 
total entrepreneurial activity. The sign and statistical 
significance for the social desirability index are con-
sistent with the work presented by Powell and Rodet 
(2012). In contrast to the results from the 2009 OLS 
regression, the panel model suggests social approval 
impacts the individual’s decision to engage in entre-
preneurial activity.xxii Also, a one percentage-point 
increase in the cost of starting a business is associated 
with a 0.117 percentage-point increase in TEA. This 
surprising result may be explained by a change in the 
distribution between the formal and informal sector. 
Furthermore, an increase in the unemployment rate is 
associated with a decline in TEA, which suggests that 
people are less likely to leave their existing jobs and 
become entrepreneurs in a bad economy. All other 
variables are statistically insignificant, and the signs of 
xxi  Since the p-value from the Hausman test is 0.8519, the null hypothesis 
that the difference between the two sets of point estimates equals zero is 
accepted.  Results from the Hausman test reveal that systematic differences 
between the fixed effect and random effects method do not exist, and that the 
random effects model can be used.  
xxii  Since the Social Desirability Index has a mean of 54.37 and a standard 
deviation of 7.34, the effect of a one standard-deviation increase in the Social 












































































































determinants of cross-national entrepreneurial activity
the insignificant explanatory variables are consistent 
with theory. 
Due to the presence of serial correlation, the re-
gression results in Column 1 may be incorrect because 
correlation between the country’s error terms over 
time results in incorrect standard errors. This source 
of error can arise when the omitted variables included 
in a country’s error term are correlated across time 
periods. For example, this model fails to adequately 
control for the creation of a new entrepreneurial clus-
ter, the allocation of substantial national resources to 
venture capital, or entrepreneurial success that reduc-
es a country’s fear of failure, all within the 2002–2010 
timeframe. Since the development of Silicon Valley 
precedes this timeframe, it is included in country fixed 
effects. However, other entrepreneurial clusters in 
countries in the dataset were developed in the middle 
of this time frame and are thus not included in coun-
try fixed effects. For example, cities such as London, 
New York, Berlin, and Tel Aviv did not develop the 
networks to support entrepreneurs with access to ven-
ture capital and experienced entrepreneurs until the 
middle or end of this time frame. In order to address 
this source of error, Column 2 reports standard errors 
that are clustered at the country level to allow for cor-
relation within a country over time.37, xxiii 
While the point estimates remain unchanged, 
the magnitude of clustered standard errors changes 
slightly, which impacts the level of significance for 
many explanatory variables. In Column 2, the regres-
sion results are presented for a panel data model with 
clustered standard errors at the country level. Per-
capita GDP and its quadratic are both statistically sig-
nificant at the 0.01 level and 0.05 level, respectively, 
and jointly significant at the 0.01 level with a p-value 
of 0.0018. Access to capital and the Social Desirability 
Index remain statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
The effect of the cost of starting a business loses statis-
tical significance when the model includes clustered 
standard errors.xxiv  
To test the effect of regulatory constraints on for-
mal-sector entrepreneurship, Column 3 of Table 4 re-
ports the regression results for the business entry den-
sity rate, or the number of new businesses with limited 
liability per 1,000 persons, an alternative measure of 
entrepreneurial activity. Provided by the Doing Busi-
xxiii  Clustered standard errors are also known as heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors.  
xxiv  When the models present in Columns 1 through 3 remove time 
effects from the models, the effect of unemployment becomes negative and 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
ness dataset, the business entry density rate measures 
the number of new businesses with limited liability per 
1,000 working-age people (aged fifteen to sixty-four) 
per year.38, xxv In this panel dataset, the mean level of 
business density is 3.40 with a standard deviation of 
3.21. The minimum is the Dominican Republic with a 
business entry density rate of 0.41, and the maximum 
is Panama with a business entry density rate of 16.36. 
In order to establish limited liability, entrepreneurs 
must recognize their business operation as a formal 
business that must adhere to the regulations imposed 
by the state. In the very early stages of a business, when 
entrepreneurs are exploring the business opportunity 
or working on their business plan, they probably will 
not obtain limited liability. As entrepreneurs begin 
to expand and hire employees, the incentive to have 
legal protection through limited liability increases. A 
company must have limited liability in order to receive 
venture capital. Therefore, this measure of entrepre-
neurship focuses on later-stage entrepreneurs, while 
the TEA captures very early stage entrepreneurs. Since 
the process and expense of obtaining limited liability 
varies by country, entrepreneurs will likely seek lim-
ited liability at different stages in different countries. 
While TEA includes both the formal and informal 
sector, the business entry density rate just measures 
new business entering the formal sector.  
Consistent with the previous models, the effect 
of the percentage of the population engaged in venture 
capital is statistically significant at the 0.05 level when 
the business entry density rate is the dependent vari-
able. While the Social Desirability Index influences 
the decision to become an entrepreneur as measured 
by TEA, the index has a statistically insignificant ef-
fect on business entry density rate. Previous results 
suggest that societal approval influences the decision 
to engage in entrepreneurial activity. However, the re-
sults of Column 3 in Table 4 indicate that societal ap-
proval has a statistically insignificant influence on ear-
ly-stage entrepreneurial success. Although the size of 
the urban population and the level of unemployment 
have a statistically insignificant effect on TEA, they 
both have a statistically significant influence on entre-
preneurial success. A one percentage-point increase 
xxv  According to the Doing Business dataset, “Limited liability is a concept 
whereby the financial liability of the firm’s members is limited to the value of 
their investment in the company. It is a separate legal entity that has its own 
privileges and liabilities. This study collects information on all limited liability 
corporations regardless of size. Partnerships and sole proprietorships are not 
considered in the analysis due to the differences with respect to their definition 
and regulation worldwide.” Doing Business, “Entrepreneurship,” http://www.
doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/entrepreneurship/methodology
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in unemployment is associated with a 0.161-unit de-
cline in the business entry density rate, which suggests 
that, in a poor economy, startups are less likely to suc-
ceed or enter the formal sector by obtaining limited 
liability protection. A one percentage-point increase 
in the percentage of the population living in urban ag-
glomerations is associated with a 0.056-unit increase 
in the business entry density rate. As countries devel-
op strong urban agglomerations, entrepreneurs may 
have greater access to business networks to help them 
succeed. Additionally, in more developed countries, 
the incentive to have limited liability protection may 
increase, as entrepreneurs may have a greater chance 
of being sued or caught for operating in the informal 
sector. Although the cost of starting a business has a 
statistically insignificant effect on entrepreneurship as 
measured by TEA, it has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on business entry density rate. A 
one percentage-point increase in the cost of starting a 
business as percentage of per-capita income is associ-
ated with a 0.054-unit decline in business entry densi-
ty rate. While regulatory constraints do not influence 
the decision to engage in entrepreneurial activity in 
models with clustered standard errors, they appear to 
have an effect on the decision to obtain limited liabil-
ity and enter the formal sector. All other explanatory 
variables are statistically insignificant and have signs 
consistent with this article’s theory. 
Based on the results of the panel data analysis, 
the access to capital, measured by the percentage of 
the population engaged in venture capital, has the 
most statistically significant impact on entrepreneur-
ial activity across the different panel data models. 
Capital constraints limit entrepreneurship as mea-
sured by both TEA and the business entry density 
rate. Therefore, access to capital affects both the de-
cision to engage in entrepreneurship and then ear-
ly-stage entrepreneurial success. Efforts to promote 
entrepreneurship could begin with an initiative to im-
prove access to capital. While regulatory constraints 
have a positive or statistically insignificant effect on 
TEA, they have a negative and statistically significant 
impact on business entry density rate. This suggests 
that entrepreneurs work to overcome any regulatory 
constraints when they commit to starting a business, 
but regulation reduces the incentive to obtain limited 
liability. Extensive regulations could also reduce the 
likelihood of achieving early-stage entrepreneurial 
success. While taxes and high start-up costs slightly 
reduce formal-sector entrepreneurial activity, based 
on these results, they appear not to impact the deci-
sion to become an entrepreneur as measured by TEA. 
Although regulation on new firms likely helps pro-
tect consumers and the environment, policymakers 
should understand that it might limit formal-sector 
entrepreneurial activity as measured by the business 
entry density rate. 
Overall, these results imply that initiatives to 
promote entrepreneurship should be comprehensive 
in scope and address all components from promoting 
the venture capital industry to increasing the level of 
economic development and improving the societal 
perception of entrepreneurship. Building on these 
empirical results, the next and final section offers pol-
icy implications for governments that seek to promote 
entrepreneurial activity.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 Based on the results of the empirical models 
presented in the previous section, this chapter pro-
vides policy implications for governments that seek 
to promote entrepreneurial activity. Although policy-
makers can promote economic growth by supporting 
existing firms, this study considers policies that en-
courage new firm creation. While the results from the 
empirical model suggest that levels of entrepreneur-
ship vary with the level of per-capita GDP, this sec-
tion highlights the key factors that limit and support 
national levels of entrepreneurial activity in high- and 
upper-middle-income countries. Since Silicon Valley 
is considered the world’s leader in entrepreneurial ac-
tivity, this section also contains insights from the suc-
cess of Silicon Valley that are relevant for governments 
seeking to promote entrepreneurship.39, xxvi In addi-
tion to presenting the main findings of the study, this 
section presents opportunities for future research. 
Across all regression models presented in the 
previous section, access to capital has a positive and 
statistically significant influence on the level of entre-
preneurial activity. Without capital, innovative ideas 
that initiate the process of “creative destruction” can-
not be realized. For new entrepreneurial communities, 
this poses an even bigger challenge, as entrepreneur-
ial success is a great incentive for investors to allocate 
funds towards entrepreneurial activity. Once funding 
xxvi 70 percent of venture-backed companies in the United States with 
valuations of at least $1 billion operate in Silicon Valley. Furthermore, 
approximately half of all venture capital in the United States is invested in 
Silicon Valley. Cromwell Schubarth, “24 billion-dollar startups: 70% from 
Silicon Valley, San Francisco,” Silicon Valley Business Journal (October
2013): 1.
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begins to flow into a community, a feedback loop is 
created through endogenous growth. Since success-
ful entrepreneurs have greater insights into the factors 
that drive startup success and failure, they are well-
positioned to become venture capitalists, who then 
provide further funding into the communities they 
are involved in. In addition to supplying capital, they 
share their entrepreneurial experiences and business 
acumen with the firms in which they invest. However, 
the greatest challenge in creating an entrepreneurial 
cluster is helping the first generation of entrepreneurs 
access startup capital. 
The history of Silicon Valley demonstrates how 
successful entrepreneurs can become venture capi-
talists who help perpetuate entrepreneurial activity 
in their region. Silicon Valley’s early entrepreneurs 
built their technology businesses with government 
contracts for war technology and support from Stan-
ford University. In fact, from 1951 to 1953, firms in 
California earned thirteen billion dollars in prime 
military contracts, and the state’s share of military 
contracts increased from 13.2 percent to 26 percent. 
Although a portion of that money went to the aero-
space industry in Los Angeles and San Diego, Silicon 
Valley firms succeeded by catering to the needs of the 
military market. Military contracts both funded new 
research and transformed small startups into big busi-
nesses.40 After establishing the foundation of their 
businesses with public resources, these businesses re-
oriented their firms towards consumer markets and 
built a thriving entrepreneurial community. Govern-
ment contracts served as a key catalyst for the creation 
of Silicon Valley, the world leader in entrepreneur-
ship. If public resources can help regions overcome 
initial capital constraints, then successful startups 
can reinvest their profits into new firms in the area. 
Given the importance of the venture capital industry 
for national levels of entrepreneurial activity, govern-
ments could direct resources towards capital for new 
companies. For example, governments could provide 
startup capital through loans, create grant programs 
for entrepreneurs, or provide government contracts 
that would support new firm creation and possibly a 
cycle of entrepreneurship.
Due to the risk surrounding the venture capital 
industry, not all projects that receive financial back-
ing will succeed, but projects that fail may still further 
the process of “creative destruction.” According to 
Shikhar Ghosh, a lecturer at Harvard Business School, 
approximately 75 percent of venture-backed compa-
nies in the U.S. fail to return investors’ capital.41 For 
example, Solyndra, a Silicon Valley producer of solar 
power arrays, received $535 million in loans from the 
federal government as part of President Obama’s $80 
billion clean technology program. However, competi-
tion from Chinese manufacturers that had been sub-
sidized by China undercut Solyndra in the U.S. mar-
ket.42 From December 2010 to August 2011, the price 
of a solar array fell 42 percent, according to the En-
ergy Department.43  Solyndra filed for bankruptcy on 
September 1, 2011.  While some analysts suggest that 
Solyndra’s solar panels were excessively expensive to 
produce and view Solyndra as an example of poor gov-
ernment investing, other solar panel companies such 
as Evergreen Solar and SpectraWatt, which received 
financial backing from Intel and Goldman Sachs, also 
failed as a result of the fall in solar panel prices caused 
by China’s subsidies to its own solar panel industry. 
Furthermore, Solyndra received $1 billion in private 
investment in addition to the public loan.44 While 
Solyndra failed, future entrepreneurs can advance re-
newable technology by learning from Solyndra’s mis-
takes. Although Solyndra could not offer competitive 
prices, it advanced the process of “creative destruc-
tion” by developing thin-film solar cells that could 
be further developed by future renewable technology 
companies.45 Governments must understand that 
failure can be a part of “creative destruction” and that 
public support for new technologies—regardless of 
whether they ultimately fail or succeed—can serve as 
a catalyst for technological development, as it did in 
Silicon Valley.  
In addition to providing resources, public fund-
ing for new firms could also help shape perceptions of 
entrepreneurial activity. Based on the panel data re-
gression models, societal approval has a positive and 
statistically significant influence on entrepreneurial 
activity. While successful entrepreneurs will likely im-
prove the perception of entrepreneurship as a desir-
able career path, the biggest challenge is encouraging 
the first generation of entrepreneurs in a geographical 
area to take the risk of leaving existing firms to start 
their own. In Silicon Valley, Stanford University Pro-
fessor Fred Terman encouraged his students to start 
their own companies near Palo Alto as opposed to 
working for existing electronics companies on the 
East Coast. For instance, he encouraged the founders 
of HP, William Hewlett and David Packard, to build 
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their business after graduation and then invested in 
the company himself. Furthermore, following World 
War II, Terman designed the Stanford Industrial Park, 
later renamed the Stanford Research Park, which pro-
vided affordable office space to new companies. The 
Stanford Industrial Park was opened in 1951 with the 
mission to create “a center of high technology close 
to a cooperative university.”46 By greatly encourag-
ing cooperation between businesses and academics in 
the area, Terman attracted new industries to offer bet-
ter employment opportunities for his students. East-
Coast technology companies such as General Electric 
and Eastman Kodak decided to lease office space and 
establish research laboratories there.47 Even IBM built 
office space close to Stanford in 1952.48  Stanford thus 
created a collaborative space for high-tech companies 
to grow in Silicon Valley, thereby encouraging high 
levels of entrepreneurial activity. Governments that 
seek to direct workers into new firms as opposed to 
existing corporations could provide support like capi-
tal and office space, following the model of the Stan-
ford Research Park, to help make entrepreneurship a 
more desirable career path.
With the support of Stanford and resources from 
public contracts, Silicon Valley’s early entrepreneurs 
helped foster a culture of innovation that encour-
aged risk-taking and improved perceptions of entre-
preneurial activity. While many such entrepreneurs 
helped shape this culture, one career that exemplifies 
the unique culture that defines Silicon Valley is that 
of Robert Noyce. A graduate of MIT, Noyce moved to 
Mountain View, California, in 1956 to work for the 
Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory. After leaving 
Shockley, Noyce cofounded Fairchild Semiconductor 
in 1957. By the time he left Fairchild in 1968 to cre-
ate Intel, Fairchild had 11,000 employees and $12 mil-
lion in profits. Instead of managing successful firms 
for long periods of time, Noyce and other early Silicon 
Valley entrepreneurs decided to create new firms in 
order to develop both new ideas and the surround-
ing area. After a successful career as an entrepreneur, 
Noyce decided to retire from daily management at In-
tel in 1975 to focus on supporting the next generation 
of high-tech entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley by serving 
on boards, investing in startups, and working to im-
prove business opportunities in Silicon Valley. Rather 
than growing out of large corporations, Silicon Valley 
became prosperous through many small but innova-
tive firms created by entrepreneurs like Noyce who 
had left profitable firms to start new ones.49 While 
Noyce felt personally compelled to continuously cre-
ate new companies, governments that seek to promote 
entrepreneurship could try to persuade successful en-
trepreneurs to leave their established companies and 
start anew. Furthermore, governments could create 
programs that encourage successful entrepreneurs to 
invest their time and resources into new companies to 
foster a community of firm creation. 
With the support of public contracts and Stan-
ford University, Silicon Valley’s early entrepreneurs 
were able to implement their ideas and then help fu-
ture entrepreneurs do the same by creating an inno-
vative culture of small “spinoff ” firms. Through the 
support of the public sector, the private sector, the aca-
demic community, and driven entrepreneurs, Silicon 
Valley minimized the impediments to entrepreneur-
ship and promoted entrepreneurial success. After the 
successes of HP, Fairchild Semiconductor, and Intel, 
starting a new firm in the area became more feasible 
and attractive, and these early successes inspired hun-
dreds of “spinoff ” firms in Silicon Valley.50 
While social desirability has a statistically signifi-
cant impact on entrepreneurship in panel data models, 
tax and regulation have a statistically insignificant im-
pact on the total entrepreneurial activity. These results 
suggest that the decision to become an entrepreneur is 
not affected by the level of regulation, so policymak-
ers should not worry about the effect of new taxes and 
regulations on startup activity. However, when the 
dependent variable only measures formal-sector en-
trepreneurial activity, the cost of starting a business 
becomes negative and statistically significant. While 
regulation might not affect the decision to become an 
entrepreneur, it affects the distribution between the 
formal and informal sectors. Although regulation and 
corporate taxes provide positive externalities to the 
consumer, governments that seek to promote entre-
preneurship should be aware of their negative impact 
on the business entry density rate. To increase the 
business entry density rate, governments could lower 
the tax rate on profits for companies’ first ten years of 
operation.
In sum, based on the regression results, the most 
effective policy to promote entrepreneurial activity 
must be comprehensive in scope and address both 
capital constraints and societal perceptions of entre-
preneurial activity. After a few entrepreneurs achieve 
success in a geographical area, investors will likely al-
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locate more funds to venture capital and more people 
will become entrepreneurs in an effort to emulate 
their success. Public funding for new entrepreneurs 
could provide both access to capital and societal ap-
proval for new firms. With a few entrepreneurial suc-
cesses, access to capital and societal approval for en-
trepreneurship will increase and promote a cycle of 
new firm creation. 
While the empirical results presented in the 
panel data section of this paper reveal that societal ap-
proval affects entrepreneurship, future research could 
investigate factors that shape and change perceptions 
of entrepreneurship. For example, societal perceptions 
of the risk associated with entrepreneurship could be 
driven by the number of successful entrepreneurs in 
a country, the portrayal of entrepreneurs in the me-
dia, or the extent of government support for entrepre-
neurs. Once research identifies factors that shape per-
ceptions of entrepreneurship, policymakers will have 
better information on how to alter such perceptions.
Since existing firms can initiate the process of 
“creative destruction,” future research could also in-
vestigate factors that drive existing firms to remain 
entrepreneurial and continue to develop new prod-
ucts and services. Data on new firms acquired by 
older firms could provide insights on where valuable 
innovation occurs in a country. Although this study 
focuses on national factors that influence early-stage 
entrepreneurial activity, future research could investi-
gate factors that drive entrepreneurial success on a na-
tional level. Governments that promote entrepreneur-
ial activity hope that new firms will initiate “creative 
destruction” and create new jobs; however, new firms 
must achieve success in order to provide benefits to 
society. Building upon this research on factors that 
influence the decision to become an entrepreneur, fu-
ture research could identify determinants of entrepre-
neurial success in both existing and new firms.
   
DATA APPENDIX
 Entit = Total early-stage entrepreneurial activity 
in county i in year t
Definition from the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor: “Percentage of the 18-64 population who are 
either a nascent entrepreneur or owner manager of a 
new business. The nascent entrepreneurship rate is the 
percentage of 18-64 population who are currently a 
nascent entrepreneur, i.e., actively involved in setting 
up a business they will own or co-own; this business 
has not paid salaries, wages, or any other payments 
to the owners for more than three months. The new 
business ownership rate is the percentage of 18-64 
population who are currently an owner-manager of a 
new business, i.e., owning and managing a running 
business that has paid salaries, wages, or any other 
payments to the owners for more than three months, 
but not more than forty-two months.” 51 
Rit = Measures of regulatory constraints that in-
cludes the procedures, time and cost associated with 
starting a business in county i in year t
Definition from Doing Business:“Doing Busi-
ness measures the number of procedures, time and cost 
for a small and medium-size limited liability company 
to start up and formally operate. The cost is report as 
a percentage of the per capita income. To make the 
data comparable across 189 economies, Doing Busi-
ness uses a standardized business that is 100 percent 
domestically owned, has start-up capital equivalent to 
10 times income per capita, engages in general indus-
trial or commercial activities and employs between 10 
and 50 people within the first month of operations.” 52
Tit = Total tax rate in county i in year t 
Definition from Doing Business: “The total tax 
rate measures the tax cost borne by the standard firm. 
The total tax is reported as a percentage of profit.” 53
Eit = Average schooling (years) in county i in 
2005
Definition from World Development Report 2013: 
“Mean of highest completed level of formal schooling 
among all persons aged 15 and above.” 54
Sit = Percentage of the population who thinks 
an entrepreneur has a high social status in county i 
in year t
Definition from Global Entrepreneurship Moni-
tor: “Percentage of 18-64 population who agree with 
the statement that in their country, successful entre-
preneurs receive high status.” 55
Nit = Percentage of the population who knows 
someone who started a business in county i in year t
Definition from Global Entrepreneurship Moni-
tor: “Percentage of 18-64 population who personally 
know someone who started a business in the past two 
years.” 56
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Fit = Percentage of the population who states 
that fear of failure would prevent them from starting a 
new business in county i in year t
Definition from Global Entrepreneurship Moni-
tor: “Percentage of 18-64 population with positive per-
ceived opportunities who indicate that fear of failure 
would prevent them from setting up a business.” 57
Cit  = Percentage of the population who lives in 
urban agglomerations of more than 1 million in coun-
ty i in year t 
Definition from World Development Indicators: 
“Population in urban agglomerations of more than 
one million is the percentage of a country’s population 
living in metropolitan areas that in 2000 had a popula-
tion of more than one million people.” 58
VCit = Percentage of the population who per-
sonally provided funds for a new business started by 
someone else (excluding any purchases of stocks or 
mutual funds) within the past three years in county 
i in year t 
Definition from Global Entrepreneurship Moni-
tor: “Percentage of 18-64 population who have per-
sonally provided funds for a new business, started by 
someone else, in the past three years.” 59
Uit = Unemployment, total (% of total labor 
force) in county i in year t
Definition from World Development Indicators: 
“Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force 
that is without work but available for and seeking em-
ployment. Definitions of labor force and unemploy-
ment differ by country.” 60
Iit  = Immigrants (% of total population) in 
county i in year t
Definition from World Development Report 
2013: “Share of the population that is foreign born; in 
percent.” 61 
Pit = Patent applications by residents and non-
residents as a percentage of the population in county 
i in year t
Definition from World Development Indicators: 
“Patent applications are worldwide patent applica-
tions filed through the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
procedure or with a national patent office for exclusive 
rights for an invention--a product or process that pro-
vides a new way of doing something or offers a new 
technical solution to a problem. A patent provides 
protection for the invention to the owner of the patent 
for a limited period, generally 20 years.” 62
Yit  = GDP per capita (in hundreds of PPP$) in 
county i in year t
Definition from World Development Indicators: 
“GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity 
(PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted 
to international dollars using purchasing power parity 
rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing 
power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United 
States.” 63
SCit = Severance pay and others costs associated 
with redundancy dismissal measured in weeks of sal-
ary per separated worker in country i in year t
Definition from World Development Report 
2013: “Separation costs include the cost of advance 
notice requirements, severance payments and penal-
ties in the case of redundancy dismissals justified by 
economic, operational or structural reasons, not by 
the behavior of the worker.” 64
The economies in the full sample, arranged by 
World Bank 2012 income level include: 
Upper-middle-income economies (23): Algeria, 
Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Hungary, Jamaica, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pan-
ama, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, 
Tonga, Tunisia, and Venezuela.
High-income economies (27): Australia, Belgium, 
Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, 
Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United 
Arab Emirates, United States and Uruguay.
The economies in the 2009 sample include:
United States, Russian Federation, South Africa, 
Greece, Belgium, France, Spain, Hungary, Italy, Ro-
mania, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Denmark, Ger-
many, Peru, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Malaysia, Japan, 
South Korea, Netherlands, Algeria, Finland, Serbia, 
Panama, Venezuela, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, 
and Jordan.
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Individual-Level Model Appendix
The individual-level model assumes that a per-
son has two choices for economic activity: entrepre-
neur or employee. The individual’s decision depends 
upon the perceived risks and rewards associated with 
the choices, and each choice has different financial 
and psychic costs and benefits. 
While an employee assumes less risk of econom-
ic failure than an entrepreneur does, the employee 
also has less control over the business and stake in the 
potential rewards. An employee can count on a fixed 
paycheck of a known amount on a predetermined day. 
The self-employed entrepreneur’s salary varies and de-
pends upon both the success of the firm and the per-
centage of the profit that the entrepreneur decides to 
reinvest in the company. On the other hand, the em-
ployee can be fired on a given day due to poor perfor-
mance, closing or restructuring of the business, or the 
boss’s whim. Unlike the employee, the entrepreneur 
must develop and execute a strategy to earn a profit or 
raise investment, a process that involves great uncer-
tainty and risk. Although entrepreneurs have greater 
control over their professional life as the firm’s leader, 
they must assume responsibility for the direction and 
vision of the company. They are held accountable for 
its success or failure, and as single proprietors or part-
ners of a firm are personally liable for the debts of the 
business.  
In the early stages of the entrepreneurial pro-
cess, prior to committing to their business idea, aspir-
ing entrepreneurs may assess the market opportunity 
while maintaining their position as a paid employee of 
another firm. Depending on the extent of the market 
research, the entrepreneur can probably balance em-
ployment with conducting research in the evenings or 
on weekends. In order to devote more time to early-
stage entrepreneurial research, aspiring entrepreneurs 
may switch to part-time employment. Aspiring entre-
preneurs with a lower risk tolerance will prefer this 
strategy of remaining employed, at least part-time, 
until the new business idea gains traction. In order 
to receive angel investment or a bank loan, entrepre-
neurs must develop a business plan that establishes a 
clear strategy and includes a target market, financial 
model, distribution channel, marketing strategy, sales 
strategy, revenue streams, cost structure, and five-year 
business projections. After assessing the market, an 
individual may conclude that the potential benefits 
exceed the risks or decide that a profitable business 
opportunity is nonexistent. Once aspiring entrepre-
neurs have a viable product and begin implementing 
their marketing and sales strategy, they may allocate 
all of their economic activity to entrepreneurship. For 
older entrepreneurs who have accumulated enough 
capital to fund their own startup, the initial process 
will have greater flexibility because they will not have 
to meet the expectations of investors. Furthermore, 
experienced entrepreneurs with an established track 
record for success can more easily raise capital. The 
optimal allocation of time between entrepreneurship 
and employment will change based on the individual’s 
life cycle and the stage of the startup.
The gains from entrepreneurial activity encom-
pass financial, social, and psychological gains. De-
pending upon the individual’s risk preferences, the 
entrepreneur will have varying psychic gains from 
starting a business; for example, individuals with a 
higher risk tolerance will experience higher psychic 
gains as entrepreneurs than as employees. Addition-
ally, people with higher needs for control, desire for 
power, or independence will derive greater psychic 
gains from entrepreneurial activity. Since the en-
trepreneurs decide whom to hire in their company, 
they could receive psychological benefits from being 
compatible with their employees and in control of the 
people with whom they work. The financial gains in-
clude the wage that the entrepreneur receives and the 
potential profits. Furthermore, these entrepreneurial 
gains vary depending upon the stage of the business; 
an entrepreneur may suffer losses both financially and 
psychologically in the first few years, but then expe-
rience gains after successfully establishing the initial 
infrastructure and strategy. 
Given the high uncertainty and failure rate of en-
trepreneurs, many individuals may derive greater util-
ity from advancing their careers within the security of 
an existing organization and earning a stable income. 
If an employee works for a prestigious firm, the em-
ployee probably receives greater social and psycho-
logical gains. The dynamic that employees have with 
their co-workers or boss will influence the social and 
psychological gains of employment. When employees 
are compatible and enjoy the firm’s corporate culture, 
the gains from employment increase. 
A utility-maximization model is used to repre-
sent an individual’s allocation of time between entre-
preneurship and employment.xxvii I assume that the 
xxvii  The theoretical model presented in this chapter is based on a model of 
criminal behavior developed by Sjoquist (1973). See Sjoquist, David Lawrence. 
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financial gain per unit of time from entrepreneurial 
activity (ge) is constant and independent of the larger 
macro influences. The psychic income that a success-
ful entrepreneur receives (ne) is also constant per unit 
of time. The total gain from entrepreneurial activ-
ity (ge + ne) · te depends solely upon the amount of 
time that the individual invests in the firm (te) over 
a one-year period.xxviii Similarly, I assume that the 
financial gain per unit of time spent as an employee 
(gw) and the psychic gain per unit of time spent as 
an employee (nw) are constant, so the total gain from 
employment is given by
(gw + nw) · tw, where tw is time as an employee 
over a one-year period. The net cost of business fail-
ure (p̄) for the entrepreneur includes quasi-fixed costs 
and variable costs that depend upon the time spent as 
an entrepreneur. An entrepreneur experiences quasi-
fixed costs associated with business failure (p*) due to 
loss of self-esteem and capital, but possibly also qua-
si-fixed gains due to an expanded skill set and liqui-
dated accumulated assets (g*). These gains help offset 
the loss of esteem and uncovered debt. The variable 
costs of failure include potential loss of references or 
contacts for future employment, which are directly 
related to the time spent as an entrepreneur (k · te), 
where k is a constant. Therefore, the model assumes 
that p̄ = p* - g* +kte, ∂p̄/∂te = k. The likelihood of 
business failure (r) is contingent upon the individual’s 
background and the macro factors (M) that influence 
entrepreneurial activity. The availability of capital (c), 
whether raised from personal wealth, angel investors 
or bank financing, education (e), and the individual’s 
standard of success (ŷ) all influence the probability of 
failure. 
r = r(c¯, e¯, ŷ+, M±)
When entrepreneurs have access to greater re-
sources, the probability of failure declines. Further-
more, entrepreneurs who succeed at raising venture 
capital may gain access to the entrepreneurial expe-
rience and acumen of the venture capitalists. Higher 
levels of education reduce the entrepreneur’s probabil-
“Property Crime and Economic Behavior: Some Empirical Results.” American 
Economic Review 63, no. 3 (1973): 439-446.
xxviii Due to the potentially large shifts in entrepreneurial income over 
time, a longer-term model would provide a more accurate measure of the 
entrepreneur’s expected gain.  Since the gains per unit of time vary greatly 
depending on the phase of the business, a measure of permanent income 
gained from entrepreneurial activity would be more appropriate, but also 
mathematically more complex.
ity of failure. As entrepreneurs establish higher stan-
dards for success, the probability of failing to attain 
those standards increases. As discussed earlier, macro 
conditions will affect the entrepreneur’s probability of 
success. Nevertheless, for simplicity, I will regard the 
probability of failure (r) as exogenous, predetermined 
by the individual.
While many additional factors influence the in-
dividual’s risk reward profile, the expected utility for 
economic activity is given by the following equation:
 
E(U) = (1-r)U1[(ge + ne)te + (gw + nw)tw] + 
rU2[(ge + ne)te + (gw + nw)tw - p̄]
where E(U) = the expected utility over the pe-
riod (year), which is the weighted average of the util-
ity of the individual if successful as an entrepreneur,
E(U) = (1-r)U1[(ge + ne)te + (gw + nw)tw], 
and the utility if the individual fails as an entre-
preneur, rU2[(ge + ne)te + (gw + nw)tw - p̄].    
 r = probability of failure as an entrepreneur (0 
< r < 1) 
 te = time spent as an entrepreneur (hours per 
year) 
 tw = time spent working as an employee 
(hours per year) 
 t = time allocated to economic activity (as an 
entrepreneur or employee) 
 ge = income earned as entrepreneur (wage 
rate per hour)   
 ne = psychic income from entrepreneurial ac-
tivity (per hour) 
gw = income earned as an employee (wage rate 
per hour) 
 nw = psychic income from employment (per 
hour) 
p̄ = the net cost of failing as an entrepreneur, 
which includes the net quasi-fixed costs
(p* - q*) and the variable costs (k · te) for finding 
a job that is directly related to how long the individual 
spent as an entrepreneur 
Individuals will maximize this expected utility 
subject to the following time constraint:
t = te + tw.  In this model, we assume positive, 
but diminishing, marginal utilities of income 
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(U’1 > 0, U’2 > 0, U”1 < 0, U”2 < 0) where
 U’1 = dU [(ge + ne)te + (gw + nw)tw]/d[(ge + 
ne)te + (gw + nw)tw] > 0
and 
U’2 = dU[(ge + ne)te + (gw + nw)tw - p̄]/d(ge + 
ne)te + (gw + nw)tw - p̄] > 0.
The Lagrangian function is given by the follow-
ing equation, where λ is the Lagrange multiplier:
L(te, tw, λ) = E(U) + λ(t – te – tw) 
The first order conditions are: 
∂L/ ∂te = (1 – r) U’1 (ge + ne) + rU’2(ge + ne 
– k) - λ = 0 
∂L/ ∂tw = (1 – r) U’1 (gw + nw) + + rU’2(gw 
+ nw) - λ = 0
∂L/ ∂ λ = t – te – tw = 0
Note that λ* = E(Ū)/dt.  λ*, or the optimal 
value of λ, represents the marginal utility of time. It 
reveals the rate of increase of the maximum value 
of expected utility as the time constraint is relaxed. 
From the first two marginal conditions, the optimal 
decision rule for the allocation of time can be derived.
(1 – r) U’1/ rU’2  = [(gw + nw) - (ge + ne) + k] 
/ [(ge + ne) - (gw + nw)]
or
(expected marginal utility if entrepreneur/ ex-
pected marginal utility if employee) = 
(net opportunity cost if entrepreneur/ net op-
portunity cost if employee)
The ratio of the marginal utilities reveals the 
marginal rate of substitution between time spent as 
an entrepreneur and employee. This ratio is the slope 
of an indifference curve in the graph below because 
it reveals the amount of entrepreneurial time an in-
dividual is willing to substitute for an additional unit 
of employment time while maintaining the same level 
of expected utility. (See Figure 2.) It explains the trad-
eoff between the two economic activities given the 
potential gains, costs, and probability of failure as-
sociated with entrepreneurial activity. Individuals are 
constrained by the amount of time they can devote 
to economic activity, and the ratio of the opportunity 
costs identifies the relative opportunity costs of the 
individual devoting time to being an employee or en-
trepreneur given the time constraint (t). When these 
two ratios are equal, the individuals maximize their 
marginal utility subject to the time constraint. At this 
point, the individual reaches the highest level of satis-
faction from economic activity given the net costs of 
the different types of economic activity and the time 
constraint. 
At point A, the individual maximizes utility sub-
ject to the time constraint by devoting all economic 
time to entrepreneurial activity.xxix If this individual 
were to devote an additional unit of economic time to 
employment, the level of utility would fall to a lower 
indifference curve, as shown by the arrows. At this 
point, the net opportunity cost of being an employee 
is given by [[gw + nw) – (ge  + ne)] * t. At point C, 
the individual maximizes utility by devoting all eco-
nomic time to employment. The net opportunity cost 
of being an entrepreneur is given by ge +ne – gw +nw 
– k*t.   
At the points of tangency,  
-[(gw + nw) - (ge + ne)]/ [(ge + ne) - (gw + nw) 
– k] = -r U’2/ (1-r)U’1, 
xxix The corner solutions, points A and C, are not necessarily the points of 
tangency between the indifference curves and the time constraint, as with 
nonlinear programming.  If these are not points of tangency, the marginal 
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 or the ratio of the net opportunity costs, equals 
the ratio of the expected marginal utilities, which 
relates to the condition previously derived from the 
first-order conditions. Note, when the probability of 
failure ( increases, the indifference curve mapping 
becomes steeper. Ceteris paribus, this would increase 
the time spent as an employee. 
In general, the reduced form equations for the 
choice variables are: 





-, r +, p̄ +, t+)
where r = r(c-, e-, ŷ+, m±) and p̄ = p(p* +, g*-, 
k+)
and and are the optimal values found from solv-
ing first-order conditions. 
The equation for t̄e represents the individual’s 
demand for entrepreneurial activity, and the equation 
for t̄w represents the individual’s demand for employ-
ment, with the influences indicated by the signs over 
the arguments.  
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